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Abstract
We propose a micro-econometric investigation into the relation between subjective life
satisfaction and income distribution, using a balanced panel survey of the Russian
population (RLMS), running from 1994 to 2000, including 4096 individuals. We show
that in the context of the Russian very volatile environment, Hirschman’s (1973)
“tunnel effect” conjecture seems to be validated : variables reflecting income
distribution do not influence satisfaction through social comparisons; individuals rather
seem to use their informational content in order to form their expectations. The
reference group’s income exerts a positive influence on individual satisfaction, which
contrasts with other studies on the subject. Inequality indices do not affect individual
welfare.
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I. Introduction
How does income distribution affect individual utility? In a seminal paper, Hirschman
(1973) suggested that individuals could derive positive flows of utility from observing
other people’s faster progression if they interpret this evolution as a sign that their turn
will come soon (for instance if the other lane of cars starts progressing towards the exit
while their lane is still immobile in a tunnel’s traffic jam). Dubbed the “tunnel effect”
after the metaphor used by the author, this suggests that rising inequality may increase
welfare, even for the poor, if it is interpreted as a positive signal. This is at odds with the
vision of Thurow ( 1977) who indicated that people may dislike inequality as such
because they have quasi-aesthetic preferences for more equal distributions of wealth.
The same opposition can be found, concerning the interpretation of the reference level
of income, i.e. the income of a reference group, which can be defined as the set of
“relevant others” (e.g. peers, people living in the same area, of the same gender, doing
the same job, with the same level of qualification, or people just above me in the
distribution of income, etc.). On the one hand, the notion that utility is relative dates
back to Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) and implies that individual utility
depends on the comparison of one’s income relative to a reference level, i.e. to the
income of a reference group. This comparison effect has been documented since then,
e.g. van de Stadt et al. (1985) and Clark and Oswald (1996); its consequence is that the
reference group’s income should affect individual utility negatively. On the other hand,
Hirschman’s conjecture suggests that an individual can use the observation of his
reference group’s income as an information about his own perspectives (see also Levy-
Garboua and Montmarquette, 2001), hence derive a positive utility from it. There are
then at least two ways in which income distribution may affect subjective welfare :
either as a direct argument in individual utility, or as a piece of information used to form3
expectations about future variables
1. Our purpose is to try to disentangle these two
aspects, focusing on the notion of the reference level of income.
We propose an empirical test of this issue based on the analysis of individual life
satisfaction judgements; we use the 5 last rounds of the Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a representative household survey that runs from
December 1994 to October 2000
2. The balanced panel includes 4096 individuals
(descriptive statistics are presented in Annex II). We hinge on the longitudinal, panel
nature of the data in order to analyze intra-individual variations in satisfaction, using
various econometric specifications as a test of robustness of the results.
This relies on an interpretation of the transition as a natural experiment characterized by
an unusually high variance in absolute and relative incomes. Since 1992 indeed,
transition countries have witnessed large movements in the distribution of wealth,
income and labor market status, due to the transformation of the coordination system,
the productive structure and relative prices in the economy. These evolutions have been
associated with a high degree of uncertainty both at the individual level (employment
and income perspectives) and at the aggregate level (macroeconomic and regulatory
environment). Rising income inequality is an important part of this evolution
3. In the
particular case of Russia, the presence of mineral and energy resources, and their
privatization through the 1995 «loans for share» program, has led to a sharp increase in
the income gap. The swings in macroeconomic policy also shook the population’s
income (Tables A1 to A3 in Annex I) from the years of high inflation 1992-1995,
                                               
1 This implies that agents are forward looking and that their satisfaction depends not only on their current
income, but also on their expected schedule of future income flows. An extreme version of this
assumption is the theory of anticipatory feelings (Leahy and Caplan, 2000).
2 All information about the RLMS, including the data itself, is available on the internet at the address
www.epc.unc.edu/projects/rlms.
3 In the late 1980’s, the Gini coefficient for socialist economies averaged about 23 points, whereas
Western countries’ coefficients were about 6 points higher. With the transition, these coefficients have
increased, sometimes dramatically, above 50 in Russia for example. This results from explicit and
implicit asset redistribution, primarily through privatization, the suppression of subsidies, the
liberalization of wages and prices, and the gap between the State and the new more productive private
sector’s wages (see also Brainard, 1999, Ferreira, 1999 and Commander et al., 1999).4
through a period of monetary austerity and exchange rate stability, until the 1998
devaluation and the following resumption of growth (see Lokshin et al., 2000).
How do individuals perceive these important fluctuations? Is the Hirschman assumption
verified? We believe that the Russian context constitutes an ideal material to test this
conjecture as it enshrines all the necessary ingredients: uncertainty, growing inequality
and prospects for development. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) have already advocated
the presence of a “tunnel effect” in Russia, based on the analysis of the demand for
income redistribution in 1996. Analyzing the answers to the question “do you agree that
the government should restrict the income of the rich?”, they show that individuals who
answer positively are not necessarily those who are poorer but rather those whose
perspectives are more uncertain. This is consistent with the conjecture that it is not
inequality per se that affects individual utility. We pursue the exploration of this issue
concentrating on the notion of the reference level of income. We show that in the
Russian very volatile environment, individuals appreciate positively the evolution of
their reference group’s income, which suggests that the informational effect dominates
the comparison effect.
The next section presents the empirical strategy with more details; section 3 discusses
the results and section 4 concludes.
2. Empirical strategy
We use the 5 last rounds of the RLMS household survey that runs from December 1994
to October 2000. The balanced panel includes 4096 individuals
4 and is representative of
the Russian population
5 (descriptive statistics are presented in Annex II). We analyze
                                               
4 The panel nature of the data is crucial in order to avoid the usual inter-personal comparison and omitted
variables problems associated with the analysis of subjective satisfaction judgements. It is also necessary
in order to take into account the dynamic nature of satisfaction variables. This is, to our knowledge, the
first study exploiting the whole time dimension of the RLMS data. Ravallion and Loshkin have used this
database in the past (2000 and 2001), but they have either concentrated on the analysis of one round or
simply used the difference between 2 rounds.
5 As the survey is based on a stratified sample of dwelling units, the attrition bias is due households or
individuals who move (not talking about non response); it represent about 15% of the initial sample, a
low rate by international standards. The attrition bias although small, essentially consists in the loss of5
the answers to the Life Satisfaction Question contained in the adult questionnaire
6. The
question is :  “to what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present
time?”. Respondents must tick one of the following answers : fully satisfied, rather
satisfied, both yes and no, less than satisfied, not at all satisfied. We interpret this
ordinal, discrete variable as a proxy for the flow
7 of utility derived by individuals,
assuming a latent continuous utility function. Due to the smallish proportion of people
choosing the fully satisfied answer, we aggregate the fully and rather satisfied together.
Obviously (Table 1), the distribution of the population into satisfaction categories varies
during the considered period, with a general movement of rising dissatisfaction until
1998 and an upheaval of satisfaction from 1998 to 2000 (which can be associated with
the return of growth and domestic production after the 1998 devaluation of the ruble).
                                                                                                                                         
urban households, especially from Moscow and St Petersburg regions, as well as of households with
higher income and expenditure. Attrition also has the effect of aging the panel of individuals.
6 An alternative choice would be to use the “economic rank” question which is formulated the following
way: "and now please imagine a 9 steps ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest
people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are you today?” (see Table E1 in
Annex II). Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) interpret this variable as a measure of “economic satisfaction”.
As this question contains a notion of comparison, using it would be tautological for our purpose. In round
9, a specific question is asked about economic satisfaction: "Tell me please, how satisfied are you with
your economic conditions at the present time?”. The interviewed person must tick one response out of the
same set as for the life satisfaction question, from very satisfied to not at all satisfied. It turns out that the
answers to this question are more correlated with life satisfaction (R
2 = 0.57) than with economic rank
(R
2= 0.42), confirming our view that economic rank is too narrow a concept for our purpose. The same
results hold with Spearman rank correlation coefficients (the R
2 are respectively equal to 0.57 versus
0.44).
7 The alternative would be to consider the answer as a measure of the stock of happiness accumulated by
the individual. We believe that the way the question is formulated encourages the interviewed person to
think about his current life conditions as opposed to the average satisfaction over his entire life.6
Table 1
The Evolution of Life Satisfaction in Russia 1994-2000
To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time ?
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Total
Not satisfied
% 22.80 28.75 31.80 37.85 23.93
5636
29.13
Rather not
% 44.18 38.54 37.99 34.68 38.75
7495
38.74
Yes and no
% 20.48 20.80 19.89 17.17 21.88
3874
 20.02
Satisfied (fully and rather)
% 12.53 11.91 10.32 10.30 15.44
2344
12.11
Total 3671 3736 3827 4049 4066 19349
The mobility of individuals across categories of satisfaction during the 5 rounds of the
RLMS study (Table 2) is noticeable. In average, only about 40% of the population
remains in the same category from one round to the other. The most stable category is
the not satisfied at all, with 50% of that class remaining in the same category
throughout the study. The other categories are less stable, and it is surprising that almost
10% of the rather not satisfied become satisfied at some point, while 13% of the
satisfied become unsatisfied.
Table 2
The Mobility of Satisfaction Responses Across the 5 Last Rounds of RLMS
Not satisfied Rather not Yes and no Satisfied Total
Not satisfied
% 50.71 31.95 11.91 5.43
4626
100
Rather not
% 26.60 45.38 18.77 9.24
5875
100
Yes and no
% 19.14 36.29 30.62 13.94
2962
100
Satisfied
% 12.88 29.16 24.00 33.96
1708
100
Total  % 30.95 37.68 19.58 11.78 100
Total observations 4696 5717 2971 1787 15171
Using satisfaction judgements requires some explanation as these variables are
sometimes regarded with suspicion by economists who are more attached to action-7
revealed preferences
8, even though the stock of economic studies based on subjective
data is important and vivid
9. The reluctance to use subjective data is motivated by a
multifaceted doubt about the psychological mechanisms that underlie people’s sayings:
social constraints on self image, cultural biases towards demonstrating or hiding
satisfaction, interaction with the surveyor, questionable lucidity and memory of the
surveyed person, formulation and questions order effects, answers to irrelevant
questions, cognitive dissonance, «mood effects»
10 (see Bertrand et Mullainathan, 2001)
and difficulty to interpret the answers. This last point may well be the most delicate,
whereas the others result in classical measurement errors which can be benign if they
are not correlated with explanatory variables. The specific difficulty with subjective
variables rests in the possible bias introduced by language or culture in the link between
the latent variable (actual satisfaction) and its expression (satisfaction judgements). The
main issue is whether individuals associate the same labels to the same satisfaction
level. If not, then interpersonal comparisons of responses are meaningless. Dubbed the
«anchoring effect» (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1997), this problem is not
insuperable as long as it is possible to depart from the analysis of satisfaction levels and
turn to variations in satisfaction. The anchoring effect is thus a problem for cross-
section analysis (especially if the anchor is correlated with explanatory variables), but
not for longitudinal panel data.
Using subjective data raises other problems such as analyzing discrete observations,
assuming the same utility function for many individuals
11, and dealing with individual
                                               
8 A distinction is often made between decision utility, which reflects preferences, and experienced utility a
more Benthamian notion, which can diverge from the former (see for example Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
We refer to the second notion.
9 A stream of recent research on political values, demand for redistribution and votes, hinges on
subjective attitudinal questions including life satisfaction, e.g. Alesina, di Tella, and Mac Culloch (2000),
Corneo and Grüner (2000, 2001), Corneo (2000), Di Tella and Mac Culloch (2001), Ravallion and
Lokshin (2000).
10 According to Diener et al. (1999) however, empirical studies reveal that the stable component of
satisfaction is dominant in the satisfaction answers. Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) note that even though
mood variability may reduce the statistical fit with the regressors related to long term determinants of
welfare, it is not an obvious source of bias.
11 The problem is that considering a common subjective welfare function for everybody (even allowing
for individual effects) implies making inter-personal comparisons and assuming that one is actually8
heterogeneity and unobserved variables. However, far from than being specific to
subjective data, these caveats are the common lot of econometric analysis. Rather, our
main difficulty will be to implement panel data analysis in order to deal with individual
heterogeneity
12, while respecting the ordinal nature of the satisfaction variable.
The last objective can be met using an ordered logit (or probit) statistical model (see van
Praag et al., 2000, for instance) of the following form: as individuals answer the life
satisfaction question, they choose among 5 verbal labels which we collapse into 4
ordered categories u1...u4 . Hence, if Uit is the latent utility function and uk the declared
level of satisfaction (with t=1, 5), we can write:
P(Uit = uk) = P(mk-1 < F (eit, Xit, q) < mk ) ,     k = l, 4 (1)
Or equivalently :
P(Uit = uk | Xit) = P(mk-1 < q ’.Xit + e it   < mk ) ,    k = l, 4 (2)
Where, F is a linear satisfaction function depending on a vector of characteristics Xit, a
parameter vector q , a random variable e it that follows a normal a logistic distribution,
and a set of parameters mk (cut-points).
In order to take heterogeneity into account, the most usual route is to assume that
unobserved individual heterogeneity takes the form of an additive individual (fixed or
random) effect ni which is explicitly included in the individual welfare function (i.e. eit =
                                                                                                                                         
dealing with measures of utility (cardinalization) instead of a mere ranking of utility levels. This is a
strong assumption in view of the foundations of economic theory. However, the idea of preference
intensity has its partisans. Ng (1997) for instance, pleads for the cardinality of utility on the basis of his
conviction that he is able to estimate exactly how much he prefers bundle A to bundle B (see also Van
Praag, 2000). Physicians have established the positive correlation between emotional expressions or brain
activity and answers to satisfaction questions, which suggests that "a materialistic (biological, neural)
basis of mind makes interpersonal comparisons of utility possible" (Ng, 1997). Diener et al. (1999) show
that individuals are able to recognize and predict the satisfaction levels of others; in particular, their
spouses or friends. Ultimately, there is almost no measure of economic policy that can be thought of
without inter-personal comparison of utility.
12 Neglecting individual heterogeneity can lead to a problem of omitted variables that can seriously bias
the estimation of the welfare function and lead to spurious regressions. The intuition of this problem is
that there are some time invariant individual characteristics ("personality") that influence both the
explanatory variables (income for instance) and satisfaction.9
hit  + ni) . One can then deal with the fixed effect by taking the first difference or the
difference to the mean of relevant variables (see Mundlak, 1978). However, in the case
of satisfaction judgements, it would make no sense to calculate such differences (uit -
ui.), as the observed variable uit is ordinal. As there is no accepted general method for
panel analysis allowing ordered probit or logit with fixed effects, we are thus confronted
with a methodological dilemma : respecting the ordinal nature of the life satisfaction
variable or using standard linear panel techniques. Our choice is to explore many routes
and check that the results are robust to the method.
(i) We run maximum-likelihood ordered logit estimations with variants in which a
Mundlak transformation of the exogenous variables reproduces the between (Xi.)
and within (Xit – Xi.) effects. We apply this treatment to all variables for which
there are reasons to suspect individual heterogeneity (e.g. income and
expenditure categories). We control for the fact that the 5 observations per
individual are certainly not independent.
(ii) We treat the life satisfaction variable as a continuous one. We use linear fixed
effects regressions as well as standard dynamic panel techniques
13. Di Tella and
Mac Culloch (1999) do this as a test that the more simple specification without
the lagged dependent variable holds, thus as a check test. We follow the same
approach.
Of course, this route is purely heuristic. It relies on the heroic assumption that
observations (individual responses) are points of the latent variable itself, i.e.
exact measures of individual satisfaction. This raises many problems. First, it
                                               
13 Satisfaction is indeed certainly a dynamic variable, e.g. it could be a mean- reverting process, a target-
aiming process or an addiction process. This requires taking lagged values of satisfaction into account.
However, because of unobserved heterogeneity, including the lagged dependent variable in the right hand
side of the equation will create some auto-correlation of the residuals. Differencing the data also makes
the lagged variable correlated with the error term. To correct for this, the Generalized Method of
Moments technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) consists in instrumenting the differenced
lagged dependent variables with differenced dependent variable dated t-2 and earlier. In a general way,
the method consists in instrumenting the lagged satisfaction variable (t-1) with different lagged values (t-
2, t-3) and running a two-stage least squares fixed effects or first difference regression (see Sevestre and
Trognon, 1995, for instance).10
rests on the a priori unjustified
14 assumption that the (psychological) distance
between the various responses is constant, i.e. the distance between the not at all
satisfied and less than satisfied is the same as that between rather satisfied and
fully satisfied. The fact that the variable is upper-bounded (with a maximum
corresponding to the fully satisfied answer) is also a restriction on the form of
the satisfaction variable
15.
(iii) We collapse the life satisfaction variable into two categories
(satisfied/dissatisfied) and run standard conditional fixed effects logit
estimations. The cost of this strategy is of course the loss of information
incurred.
We include the results of the first method (ordered logit) in the text, and present the
outcomes of the other methods in Annex I. Eventually, the individual welfare function
that we are estimating depends on current real individual income (log Yit), income
expectations formed in t-1 (Ei t-1), the individual reference group’s income (log Yreference
it), socio-demographic characteristics (Xit), and time and regional dummies (as well as
inequality measures in some specifications) :
Uit = V [log Yit , E i,t-1 , log Yreference it  , Uit-1 ,  Xit , It ]  (3)
Hence, with the ordered logit model :
P(Uit = uk)= P(mk-1 < F (eit, log Yit , E it-1 , log Yreference it , Ui t-1 ,  Xit , It, q) < mk ) ,
 with  k = l, 4 and t = 1, 5  (4)
                                               
14 Although van Praag (1991), in a different context, argues that individuals in their attempt to make their
answers as significant as possible, always mentally divide their total imaginable welfare into equal
intervals separated by the proposed labels, which means that the difference between the various
satisfaction labels is the same in terms of welfare.
15 For a justification of this restriction, see van Praag (1971, 1991). The idea is that individuals always
evaluate their situation by comparing it to the best imaginable situation. Hence, the satisfaction score
corresponding to the best situation is 1, and the satisfaction variable in general can be represented as
running from 0 to 1.11
In equation (4), the influence of the real income variable is obvious; ceteris paribus
higher income should be synonymous with higher satisfaction. We use two categories of
income: individual real income and household real income. In the data, individual
income includes cash and non cash salaries, other paid works and income,
unemployment benefits and pensions. Household income includes all possible kinds of
income, including work payment, state transfers (children’s benefits, stipends, subsidies,
etc.), private transfers (from family, relatives, friends, church, etc.), the value of the
home production of fruits, vegetables, meat and dairy products consumed or given
away, net of the expenditure on home production (e.g. seed, fertilizers, feed), i.e. the
largest possible notion of household general net income.
However, real income is likely to be endogenous to satisfaction because of the omitted
variable problem. To deal with this issue, we run each regression both with and without
income variables. Because of measurement errors and risks of under-declaration of
income, we also alternatively replace real income with real household expenditure,
following the idea that measurement errors are smaller on the latter variable (see
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001, for example). Household expenditure data is constructed
with the same degree of analytical decomposition as household income, distinguishing
the volume and cost of each element of expenditure (on food, durable goods, furniture,
clothing, housing, rents, transportation, communication, land use, home production,
leisure, travel, services, health, insurance, credit repayment, lending, savings and
transfers). All these financial categories are deflated using a national Consumer Price
Index
16. Alternatively, we have used regional price indices and regional poverty lines
available in the RLMS data base; our results are robust to the choice of the deflator,
hence we only present those based on Russian CPI. Classically, we use the natural
logarithm of the income and expenditure categories; in the particular case of our model,
this is based on the assumption that utility is a concave function of income.
The role of information and expectations is central to our discussion of satisfaction and
reference income. Expectations may also influence satisfaction by raising the
                                               
16 CPI are constructed by the Russian statistical organ Russian Economic Trends, and are available on
their web site http://www.recep.org/ret/.12
aspirations level. We thus introduce lagged income expectations in the regressions. In
the linear specification, we apply the same method as for satisfaction: we instrument the
lagged expectations variable with lagged periods (t-2) and earlier.
One usually needs to make assumptions about the process of expectations themselves.
However, thanks to the richness of the RLSM data, we have access to a direct measure
of what we see as individual income expectations, namely the question: “Do you think
that in the next 12 months you and your family will live better than today, or worse ?”.
The answers to this question are described in Table E1 in Annex II. Expectations about
material living conditions follow about the same dynamics as that of life satisfaction
and income, i.e. a degradation from 1994 to 1998 followed by an upheaval. Again,
income expectations are variable : less than 40% of the individuals choose the same
category across all rounds. We include the response to the expectation question in (t-1)
in the regression of satisfaction at time t.
In equation (4), Xit is a vector of socio-demographic individual characteristics that
influence life satisfaction (marital status, number of kids, size of the family, region,
mother tongue, health status, education, job status). Regional dummies capture the
influence of unexplained location effects such as local public goods, local job market or
goods market externalities, or higher living standards (wages and prices). Lastly, It is a
set of year dummies that capture the effect of cyclical macroeconomic fluctuations on
individual satisfaction.
Finally, in certain specifications of equation (4), we include variables related to the
perception of income distribution such as reference group’s income, Gini indices and
Stark indices of income overhang, which are described in the following sub-sections.
Constructing the reference group’s income
Following Clark and Oswald (1996), we estimate, round by round, in a separate
regression, the logarithm of the typical real income of an individual, based on his
highest diploma, years of experience, region, age, sex, and primary occupation ILO
code (International Standard Classification of Occupations). The R
2 of the regressions13
vary between 13.7 (round 6) and 21.3 (round 9)
17. We then use the post-estimation
predicted individual log real income as a proxy for the individual’s reference group’s
income. The rationale is that this constructed variable is the average pay-off associated
with the productive characteristics of a given individual. We believe that it conveys an
important informational content. In a context where the association between skills and
pay-off is changing rapidly
18 and somewhat unpredictably, the observation of the typical
income of people sharing the same skills and the same position is a good indicator of
what an individual can expect for himself.
Inequality indices
In order to obtain individual inequality indices, we use Stark indices of income
overhang STARKH (resp. STARKL) which measure the average difference between
my income and those of richer (resp. poorer) people in the country or in my region. We
also include regional and national GINI indices of real income for each round.
3. Results
We first present the general socio-demographic correlates of life satisfaction; we then
discuss the role of the reference group’s income; lastly, we turn to the influence of
inequality. At each stage, we present the ordered logit estimations and check that the
other methods presented in section 2 lead to the same results.
The usual correlates of satisfaction
We verify that the data generate the usual socio-demographic correlates of life
satisfaction, which have proven to be quite stable accross countries (see for example
Oswald, 1997, di Tella et al., 1996, Diener and Suh, 1997, Diener et al. 1999). As
expected (Table 3), satisfaction is U shaped in age, increases with health evaluation and
                                               
17 The results of these regressions can be communicated upon demand.
18 This is due to the industrial restructuring of the country which implies the contraction of certain
activities (machine-building, metal-working) and the expansion of new ones (services), the changing
demand for the various skills (e.g. lower demand for administrative skills, higher demand for qualified
workers), the apparition of new professions (entrepreneurs), of a new private sector, etc.14
years of education, is positively correlated with religious belief, with being a male, and
with being married rather than divorced or widowed. The gender effect is specific to
Russia ; it differs from the usual finding that women are happier than men, all things
equal. Further, we find life satisfaction to be higher for those living in Moscow or St
Petersburg metropolis, having a non Russian mother tongue, and answering in round 9
(i.e. in year 2000). It is an observation of all regressions that satisfaction decreases from
round 5 to round 8 and then increases again. As expected, satisfaction is higher in more
prestigious professions such as legislators, senior managers and officials, as well as for
technicians which are in excess demand on the Russian labor market (see Grosfeld et
al., 2001). As already noted by Ravallion and Lokshin (2001), household income or
expenditure is a good predictor of satisfaction, better than individual income.
These are strong and invariant relations in all types of regression, robust to any
specification of the satisfaction equation using the RLMS data (Tables B1 to B3 in
Annex I). Hausman tests systematically show that coefficients are significantly different
in the within and the between linear specifications, which confirms the importance of
the individual fixed effects. We thus do not present random effect specifications of
linear panel estimations.
Life satisfaction is often assumed to be a mere mean-reverting process; if this were the
case, then the coefficient on lagged life satisfaction should be negative : if I was happier
yesterday than on I am average (fixed effect regression), my satisfaction should
decrease today because I am going back to my target level. Results do not confirm this
assumption; we find that the coefficient on lagged satisfaction is positive in fixed effects
specifications (Table B1 in Annex I), even though not always significant. It is also
positive in between specifications (column 2 in Table B1), which is related to inter-
individual persistent differences mentioned above (different «aptitude to happiness»).15
Table 3
Basic Regressions of Life Satisfaction
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged satisfaction 
2
Less than satisfied 0,819***
(0,042)
Yes and no 1,315***
(0,052)
Satisfied 1,965***
(0,072)
Lagged income expectations
 2
Worse 0,498***
(0,050)
0,480***
(0,050)
0,471***
(0,050)
0,470***
(0,057)
The same 0,741***
(0,047)
0,680***
(0,047)
0,680***
(0,047)
0,701***
(0,054)
Better 1,043***
(0,065)
0,924***
(0,066)
0,951***
(0,067)
0,953***
(0,076)
Income categories
Real household expenditure (log) 0,512***
(0,025)
Real household income (log) 0,393***
(0,024)
Individual income (log) 0,130***
(0,019)
Age -0,069***
(0,007)
-0,076***
(0,009)
-0,076***
(0,009)
-0,075***
(0,009)
-0,069***
(0,010)
Age square 0,001***
(0,000)
0,001***
(0,000)
0,001***
(0,000)
0,001***
(0,000)
0,001***
(0,000)
Health categories 
2
Bad health 0,622***
(0,126)
0,647***
(0,149)
0,647***
(0,149)
0,675***
(0,152)
0,746***
(0,163)
Average heath 1,213***
(0,125)
1,311***
(0,150)
1,311***
(0,150)
1,315***
(0,153)
1,428***
(0,164)
Good health 1,432***
(0,132)
1,562***
(0,157)
1,562***
(0,157)
1,547***
(0,160)
1,774***
(0,173)
Very good health 1,384***
(0,214)
1,534***
(0,257)
1,534***
(0,257)
1,573***
(0,271)
1,572***
(0,331)
Household size -0,035***
(0,012)
-0,134***
(0,015)
-0,134***
(0,015)
-0,119***
(0,015)
-0,047***
(0,017)
Believer 0,179***
(0,038)
0,205***
(0,048)
0,205***
(0,048)
0,224***
(0,048)
0,224***
(0,054)
Male 0,099**
(0,039)
0,120**
(0,048)
0,120**
(0,048)
0,129***
(0,048)
0,206***
(0,055)
Years education 0,019***
(0,006)
0,010
(0,007)
0,010
(0,007)
0,014*
(0,007)
0,013
(0,008)
Round 6 
2 0,101**
(0,045)
-0,049
(0,041)
dropped -0,281***
(0,043)
0,465***
(0,050)
Round 7 dropped -0,213***
(0,045)
-0,049
(0,041)
-0,359***
(0,042)
0,372***
(0,052)
Round 8 -0,206***
(0,045)
0,400***
(0,043)
-0,213***
(0,045)
-0,615***
(0,044)
dropped
Round 9 0,505***
(0,040)
dropped 0,400***
(0,043)
dropped 0,686***
(0,050)
1 We control for the auto-correlations of the residuals of observations relating to the same individual.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%16
Table 3 continued
Region 
2
Northern and North Western -0,423***
(0,107)
-0,334**
(0,134)
-0,334**
(0,134)
-0,306**
(0,132)
-0,455***
(0,144)
Central and Central Black-Earth -0,323***
(0,089)
-0,122
(0,113)
-0,122
(0,113)
-0,156
(0,112)
-0,283**
(0,120)
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin -0,436***
(0,089)
-0,210*
(0,113)
-0,210*
(0,113)
-0,257**
(0,112)
-0,345***
(0,123)
North Caucasian -0,442***
(0,094)
-0,287**
(0,119)
-0,287**
(0,119)
-0,230*
(0,119)
-0,355***
(0,130)
Ural -0,514***
(0,090)
-0,332***
(0,114)
-0,332***
(0,114)
-0,379***
(0,113)
-0,544***
(0,123)
Western Siberia -0,524***
(0,098)
-0,498***
(0,121)
-0,498***
(0,121)
-0,486***
(0,122)
-0,529***
(0,134)
Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern -0,318***
(0,098)
-0,271**
(0,120)
-0,271**
(0,120)
-0,259**
(0,119)
-0,282**
(0,133)
Russian tongue -0,234***
(0,048)
-0,246***
(0,060)
-0,246***
(0,060)
-0,255***
(0,061)
-0,278***
(0,071)
ISCO code 
2
Legislators, senior managers, officials 0,723***
(0,125)
0,677***
(0,154)
0,677***
(0,154)
0,688***
(0,153)
0,680***
(0,156)
Professionals 0,435***
(0,068)
0,417***
(0,081)
0,417***
(0,081)
0,418***
(0,080)
0,463***
(0,093)
Technicians 0,406***
(0,064)
0,329***
(0,075s)
0,329***
(0,075)
0,359***
(0,076)
0,356***
(0,088)
Clerks 0,178**
(0,088)
0,130
(0,102)
0,130
(0,102)
0,101
(0,102)
0,089
(0,112)
Services workers 0,230***
(0,084)
0,115
(0,098)
0,115
(0,098)
0,120
(0,100)
0,058
(0,115)
Skilled agr & fish. 0,633**
(0,253)
0,650**
(0,267)
0,650**
(0,267)
0,599**
(0,277)
0,882
(0,306)
Craft and related 0,278***
(0,062)
0,257***
(0,073)
0,257***
(0,073)
0,238***
(0,073)
0,220**
(0,086)
Operators and assemblers 0,280***
(0,061)
0,182**
(0,073)
0,182**
(0,073)
0,205***
(0,073)
0,135
(0,088)
Elementary unskilled occup. 0,080
(0,065)
0,068
(0,076)
0,068
(0,076)
0,036
(0,077)
-0,021
(0,088)
Army 0,197
(0,282)
0,117
(0,286)
0,117
(0,286)
0,120
(0,304)
0,119
(0,337)
Marital status 
2
Married 0,039
(0,064)
-0,042
(0,076)
-0,042
(0,076)
-0,002
(0,077)
-0,092
(0,088)
Divorced -0,219**
(0,089)
-0,257**
(0,106)
-0,257**
(0,106)
-0,258**
(0,107)
-0,413***
(0,119)
Widower -0,221***
(0,082)
-0,204**
(0,099)
-0,204**
(0,099)
-0,182*
(0,100)
-0,366***
(0,109)
_cut1 -0,356
(0,211)
3,314
(0,330)
3,314
(0,330)
1,965
(0,317)
0,308
(0,316)
_cut2 1,496
(0,213)
5,142
(0,332)
5,142
(0,332)
3,784
(0,319)
2,186
0,318)
_cut3 2,880
(0,214)
6,506
(0,333)
6,506
(0,333)
5,138
(0,320)
3,535
0,318)
Number of obs 14642 13073 13073 12942 9764
Wald chi2(37) 2094 1678 1678 1518 1096
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Pseudo R2 -17602 -15832 -15832 -15747 -11959
Log likelihood 0,0763 0,066 0,066 0,062 0,056
2 The reference categories are : “not at all satisfied” for lagged satisfaction, “much worse” for lagged income
expectations, “very bad health” for health evaluation, Moscow and St Petersburg for region, Round 5 for rounds,
“unemployed” for ISCO code, “single” for marital status.17
Concerning the role of income expectations, we find that, controlling or not for the level
of real income or expenditure, optimistic past income expectations attract a negative
coefficient in all fixed-effects specifications (column 1 in Table B1). Using past income
expectations as dummy variables, and taking the most pessimistic expectation of future
income (much worse) as the reference category, we find that the other categories attract
a significant and negative coefficient (column 1 in Tables B2 and B3). By contrast, the
sign of the coefficient is positive in the between specifications (column 2 in Tables B1
and B2). This is natural and expected; it reflects the difference between fixed effects
regressions, which capture the intra-individual differences in satisfaction, and
«between» regressions, which capture the inter-individual differences in satisfaction :
more optimistic persons are happier, everything else equal, but if I had high
expectations yesterday, I am more demanding today hence more difficult to satisfy.
These results are consistent with our view about the role and importance of expectations
in the formation of individual satisfaction. The next section goes deeper into the
investigation of this issue.
The influence of the reference group’s income on satisfaction
We now include the reference group’s income, constructed as indicated in section 2. In
some specifications, we also include the residual of the estimation (income gap) as a
proxy for the individual actual income. Alternatively, we control for the level of real
household income or expenditure
19. We first present the regression of life satisfaction
on the entire population including unemployed persons and those with a no individual
income.
                                               
19 Including household real expenditure in the regression is also meant to correct for possible
measurement errors, in particular the under-declaration of income.18
Table 4.a
The Positive Influence of the Reference Income (Whole Sample)
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Reference Income 0,247***
(0,0522)
0,179***
(0,051)
0,191***
(0,051)
0,403***
(0,050)
0,290***
(0,050)
Log Real Individual Income 0,156***
(0,019)
0,111***
(0,016
0,078***
(0,016)
Log  Household Expenditure 0,447***
(0,026)
0,447***
(0,026)
Log Household Income 0,443***
(0,030)
Log Income Gap 
2 0,156***
(0,019)
0,111***
(0,016)
_cut1 0,480
(0,369)
3,490
(0,409)
3,295
(0,414)
0,480
(0,369)
3,490
(0,409)
_cut2 2,356
(0,370)
5,404
(0,411)
5,207
(0,416)
2,356
(0,370)
5,404
(0,411)
_cut3 3,658
(0,371)
6,727
(0,412)
6,527
(0,417)
3,658
(0,371)
6,727
(0,412)
Number of observations 13612 13611 13580 13612 13611
Wald chi2(38) 967.600 1273.54 1213.06 967.60 1273.54
Prob > chi2 0,000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -16953 -16757 -16743 -16953 -16757
Pseudo R2 0,040 0.0507 0.0491 0.0396 0.0507
1   We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated.
2 The income gap is the difference between individual income and reference income, i.e. the residual of the
estimation of the latter.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Controls: age,
marital status, household size,  health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue, years of education,
nationality, region, round.
(4) Test that the coefficient of reference income > coefficient of income gap : chi2(1)= 22.61, Prob >
chi2=0.0000. (5) Test that the coefficient of reference income > coefficient of income gap : chi2(1 = 12.36, Prob
> chi2=0.0004.
We find that the reference group’s income exerts a positive and significant effect on
individual satisfaction (Table 4.a). This positive sign is systematic, whichever the
specification retained, whether income gap, real income or expenditure is included for
control, whether expectations are included or not. It is also verified in linear within and
between specifications, showing that the level as well as the variation in the reference
income has a positive influence on satisfaction (Tables C1 and C2 in Annex I). Of
course, the coefficients on individual income, household income, household expenditure
and income gap are also positive and significant. In the case of the income gap, the
coefficient accounts for the influence of personal income.19
Note that the estimation of the reference income gives: yi = zi + ei, where yi is the
individual income, zi is the estimated reference income and ei is the residual of the
estimation. Neglecting the other variables, the estimation of the welfare function writes:
Ui = a.yi + b.zi + mi, which is equivalent to Ui = a.zi + ei + b.zi + mi , i.e. Ui = a.ei +
(a+b).zi + mi  , where ei is the income gap, and zi is the reference income. Hence, in
order to test of the significance of the reference income, one needs to check whether
b>0, i.e. whether the coefficient on the reference income zi is greater than the
coefficient on the income gap ei.  The results in Table 4.a (columns 4 and 5) show that
this is indeed the case, and chi2 tests confirm that the difference is significant.
The notion of reference income for unemployed people or people without any individual
income could be questioned on the grounds that the “productive characteristics” of such
people are not clear
20. Hence, we run the same estimation keeping only employed
people with a strictly positive individual income. This halves the size of our sample,
which still contains about 8000 individuals. In the remainder of the analysis of the
reference income, all regressions will be made on the sub-sample of working people.
The positive influence of the reference income is confirmed by the estimation on the
sub-sample of working people (Table 4.b). The coefficient of the reference income is
significantly larger than that on the income gap. It is also larger than that of individual
income.
                                               
20 It is also well known (Heckman, 1979) that the simple estimation of an equation gain tends to
overestimate the potential income of those without an actual revenue.20
Table 4.b
The Positive Influence of the Reference Income for Working People
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Reference Income 0,297***
(0,082)
0,224***
(0,080)
0,224***
(0,080)
0,008 0,008 0,007
Log Individual Income 0,199***
(0,025)
0,186***
(0,025)
0,125***
(0,021)
0,083***
(0,021)
0,014 0,014 0,012 0,007
Log Household Expenditure 0,472***
(0,035)
0,026
Log Household Income 0,465***
(0,039)
0,027
_cut1 -1,563
(0,581)
-0,185
(0,696)
2,908
(0,736)
2,671
(0,746)
_cut2 0,387
(0,581)
1,768
(0,696)
4,901
(0,738)
4,663
(0,747)
_cut3 1,725
(0,582)
3,107
(0,698)
6,262
(0,740)
6,021
(0,749)
Number of observations 7941 7939 7939 7926
Wald chi2(38) 593.53 603.32 821.98 773.60
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -9944 -9934 -9817 -9812
Pseudo R2 0.0384 0.0392 0.0504 0.0491
1   We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated.
2 Controls: age, marital status, household size,  health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue, years of
education, nationality, region, round. Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
In each cell, the first figure is the coefficient, the second, in parenthesis, is  the standard error and the third is the
marginal effect of an increase of the independent variable by one standard deviation, on the probability of choosing
the “satisfied” response.
(2): the confidence interval of the coefficient for the reference income goes up from 0.000 to  0.002 when expectations
are introduced. (3): the confidence interval of the coefficient for the reference income goes up from 0.005 to 0.018
when expectations are introduced. (4): the confidence interval of the coefficient for the reference income goes up
from 0.005 to 0.019 when expectations are introduced.
Test that the coefficient of reference income > coefficient of income gap : chi2(1) = 13.08, Prob>chi2=0.0003
without other control, chi2(1)=7.80, Prob > chi2=0.0052 with log total real household expenditure as control.
Computing marginal effects (Table 4.b) shows that the influence of the reference
income on life satisfaction is far from negligible. Marginal effects are calculated as the
effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in the independent variable on the probability
of choosing the satisfied answer to the life satisfaction question. It turns out that the
marginal effect of the reference income amounts to about 57% of the effect of an21
increase in actual individual income and over 30% of the effect of an increase in real
household expenditure or income.
We now introduce the Mundlak distinction between intra versus inter individual effects.
We find that the variation in the reference level of income is more influential than the
average reference level, although both have positive coefficients (Table 4.c). As before,
tests show that the coefficient on the reference income is significantly higher than that
on the income gap (in variation), which proves that it does have a positive influence on
life satisfaction. In terms of magnitude, we find that the marginal effect of a 1 standard
deviation increase in the reference income is now equivalent to a 1 standard deviation
increase in individual or household income. This relates to the variation of income, the
within effect; the order of magnitude of the average reference income is 3 times lower.
This observation is consistent with the idea that it is the news conveyed in the reference
income that affects individual satisfaction, as there is clearly more information in the
variation of the reference income than in its average level.22
Table 4.c
The Positive Influence of the Reference Income in the Active Population 
1
Distinguishing Between and Within Effects
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inter-Individual Effects (Average)
Log reference income 0,266**
(0,127)
0,142
(0,123)
0,280**
(0,119)
Log real individual income 0,312***
(0,035)
0,300***
(0,036)
0,176***
(0,034)
Log real household expenditure 0,605***
(0,054)
Log real household income 0,722***
(0,052)
Intra-individual effects (Variation)
Log reference income 0,299***
(0,083)
0,254***
(0,083)
0,239***
(0,082)
Log real individual income 0,107***
(0,025)
0,095***
(0,024)
0,072***
(0,022)
Log real household expenditure 0,311***
(0,041)
Log real household income 0,334***
(0,039)
_cut1 -1,118
(0,589)
0,130
(0,784)
3,702
(0,850)
4,415
(0,862)
_cut2 0,841
(0,590)
2,091
(0,784)
5,703
(0,853)
6,413
(0,865)
_cut3 2,184
(0,591)
3,436
(0,785)
7,070
(0,854)
7,776
(0,867)
Number of observations 7941 7939 7939 7926
Wald chi2(38) 612.26 619.80 825.86 772.23
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0405 0.0412 0.0525 0.0509
Log likelihood -9922. -9913 -9796 -9793
1   We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated. We implement the
Mundlak decomposition of within and between effects of the independent variables. Standard errors in
parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
 Controls: age, marital status,
household size, health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue, years of education, nationality, region,
round.
 (2) Test that the coefficient on reference income > coefficient on income gap (within): chi2(1) = 5.17; Prob >
chi2=0.0230. (3) Test that the coefficient on reference income > coefficient on income gap (within): chi2(1)
=4.18 ; Prob > chi2 =0.0410.
These results are unusual. Studies in relative income typically find a negative relation
between reference income and satisfaction, suggesting that only relative income matters.
Clark and Oswald (1996) for instance, use a similar earnings equation on British data to
estimate the reference income of an individual, based on his productive characteristics23
(age, qualification, occupation, region, sex); they find that job satisfaction depends
negatively on what they call the «comparison income». Moreover, they find that the
coefficients of individual income and reference income, although of opposite sign, are
not significantly different in absolute value. Clark and Oswald (1994) also show that the
disutility of unemployment is relative : the unemployment of the relevant others is
positively correlated with an unemployed person’s satisfaction.
We interpret our results as the sign that in the context of the Russian transition,
reference group categories play a predominantly informational role. In other words, in a
very rapidly changing context, social comparisons per se lose significance as relative
positions are highly unstable. Rather, agents try to use as much information as possible
in order to form their expectations concerning future variables.
Controlling for individual mobility and expectations
A skeptical view could be that the favorable influence of the reference group’s income
is driven by individuals who are upwardly mobile. Under this interpretation, the
satisfaction of ascending individuals would hide the dissatisfaction of people who lose
income and suffer from the progression of their peers. In order to test this idea, we
separate the (working) population in two groups: those whose real income has increased
(or remained the same) as compared to the previous round, and those whose real income
has decreased. We then run two separate regressions on ascending and descending
people. We find (Table 4.d) that the sign of the reference income is positive and
significant in both groups. Hence, it seems that for ascending, as well as for descending
people, the progression of their peers is interpreted as a good news.
This symmetry of the “tunnel effect” is certainly related to the uncertainty of the
Russian environment. Most individuals are unsure about their future prospects and the
valuation of their specific skills, because of the rapid economic change. Hence, for
currently descending people, the progression of their peers is taken as a promise of
future improvement, while for ascending people, it is interpreted as a sign that the
favorable evolution of their situation is based on objective grounds. Ravallion and
Lokshin (2000) have shown that up to 63% of persons belonging to the upper
consumption decile in 1996 were in favor of restricting the income of the rich; the same24
was true of 44% of the subjectively richest persons (those who put themselves on rungs
7 to 9 in terms of economic rank). This is because they expected their welfare to
deteriorate in the next twelve months. Our own calculations show that in average, from
1994 to 2000, about 28% of the persons who belonged to the upper real income decile
expected their situation to become worse or much worse in the next twelve months.
Uncertainty is thus present at the top of the income ladder as well as at the bottom.
Table 4.d
The Role of the Reference Income for Ascending versus Descending People
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
1
(1) (2)
Increasing individual
income
Decreasing
individual income
Increasing individual
income
Decreasing
individual income
Log Reference Income 0,307***
(0,114)
0,345***
(0,125)
0,253**
(0,111)
0,255**
(0,121)
Log Individual Income 0,327***
(0,052)
0,085***
(0,027)
0,219***
(0,045)
0,053**
(0,024)
Log Household Expenditure 0,436***
(0,053)
0,618***
(0,058)
_cut1 -0,320
(0,981)
-0,595
(1,477)
2,355
(1,011)
3,573
(1,476)
_cut2 1,577
(0,983)
1,340
(1,476)
4,281
(1,014)
5,576
(1,477)
_cut3 2,958
(0,985)
2,707
(1,476)
5,681
(1,016)
6,979
(1,477)
Number of observations 3546 2663 3546 2663
Wald chi2(38) 333,140 272,030 431,150 385,500
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Pseudo R2 0,044 0,047 0,053 0,067
Log likelihood -4471 -3267 -4430 -3200
1   We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated.
2 Controls: age, marital status, household size,  health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue, years of education,
nationality, region, round. Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
The same results hold when controlling for the log of total real household income.
 (1) Introducing expectations dummies increases the confidence interval of the reference income coefficient from 0,007 to 0,072
for individuals whose personal income has increased since the last round, and from 0,006 to 0,012 for those whose individual
income has gone down. (2) Introducing expectations dummies increases the confidence interval of the reference income
coefficient from 0,023 to 0,141 for individuals whose personal income has increased since the last round, and from 0,036  to
0,062 for those whose individual income has gone down.
The informational role played by the reference income is comforted by the following
observation : when current expectations about future income are introduced in the
regression, they reduce the explanatory power of the reference income, especially for25
individuals whose personal income decreases (they increase the confidence interval of
the reference income coefficient so much as to change the level of significance).
As another test of our conjecture, we have selected the occupation groups whose income
increased in average from round 8 (1998) to round 9 (2000), i.e. all groups except
agricultural and military workers. Running the usual regression, we have checked that
the satisfaction of all members of this group increased with their reference income, no
matter whether their own trajectory was ascending or descending; the effect was even
more important for descending people
21.
Some further tests of the role of uncertainty
In order to assess the cognitive role of the reference income, we now include variables
that capture the volatility and uncertainty that individuals are confronted with. First, we
compute the standard deviation of individual real income across rounds. We divide the
working population in two groups depending on whether their income variability is
higher or lower than the average. We then run the usual regression on the two groups.
We find (Table 4.e) that the coefficient of the reference income is higher and more
significant for people who experience higher income volatility, hence whose income is
less predictable. This is consistent with the view that the reference income is used as a
basis to form expectations about future income. We verify that the substitutability
between reference income and expectations is greater for higher volatility groups.
                                               
21 We have checked that the same results hold when the symmetrical example is taken. Between round 7
(1996) and round 8 (1998), all ISCO groups except ISCO 1, 6 and 10 have seen their average real income
and expenditure decrease. We verified that the reference group’s income had a positive and significant
sign for everybody, although the significance of the coefficient was usually more important for
descending individuals than for ascending ones.26
Table 4.e
The Reference Income and the Volatility of Individual Income (Working People)
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
1
(1) (2) (3)
High income
volatility
Low income
volatility
High income
volatility
Low income
volatility
High income
volatility
Low income
volatility
Log Reference Income 0,409***
(0,149)
0,188*
(0,099)
0,345**
(0,146)
0,145
(0,098)
0,348**
(0,146)
0,146
(0,098)
Log Individual Income 0,075***
(0,022)
0,575***
(0,047)
0,043**
(0,021)
0,447***
(0,049)
0,015
(0,022)
0,396***
(0,051)
Log Household
Expenditure
0,496***
(0,054)
0,372***
(0,047)
Log Household Income 0,402***
(0,055)
0,408***
(0,054)
_cut1 -2,564
(1,279)
2,513
(0,831)
0,981
(1,283)
4,668
(0,885)
0,176
(1,314)
4,681
(0,884)
_cut2 -0,566
(1,278)
4,499
(0,834)
3,030
(1,284)
6,675
(0,890)
2,218
(1,314)
6,688
(0,888)
_cut3 0,796
(1,280)
5,865
(0,837)
4,420
(1,286)
8,052
(0,893)
3,595
(1,316)
8,065
(0,892)
Number of observations 2544 4376 2900 4376 2891 5035
Wald chi2(38) 483,380 809,630 365,850 865,810 336,520 562,870
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Pseudo R2 0,086 0,096 0,057 0,100 0,054 0,059
Log likelihood -3007 -5182 -3534 -5155 -3534 -6197
1We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Controls: age, marital status, household size,  health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue, years of education,
nationality, region, round.
 (1) Introducing expectations dummies increases the confidence interval of the reference income coefficient from 0,006 to
0,032 for high variance income, and from 0,057 to 0,098 for low variance income. (2 Introducing expectations dummies
increases the confidence interval of the reference income coefficient from 0,018 to 0,078 for high variance income, and from
0,137 to 0,196 for low variance income. (3) Introducing expectations dummies increases the confidence interval of the
reference income coefficient from 0,017 to 0,067 for high variance income, and from 0,135 to 0,200 for low variance income.
As another proxy for uncertainty, we now use the answer to the following question:
How concerned are you about the possibility that you might not be able to provide
yourself with the bare essentials in the next 12 months ? . Again, we divide the
population in two groups, depending on whether they answer that they are anxious or
not (we aggregate the multiple answer categories in order to obtain a dichotomic
variable). We find (Table 4.f) that the reference income plays the usual positive role for
people who are anxious about getting the basic necessities, but not for the others, a
strong result in favor of the cognitive interpretation of the reference income.27
Table 4.f
The Role of the Reference Income Depending on Material Uncertainty
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction for Working People 
1
How anxious are you about getting the basic necessities ?
Anxious Not anxious
Log Reference Income 0,275***
(0,087)
0,171
(0,203)
Log Individual Income 0,189***
(0,028)
0,081
(0,039)
_cut1 -0,045
(0,750)
-1,917
(1,561)
_cut2 1,969
(0,751)
0,275
(1,555)
_cut3 3,384
(0,753)
1,667
(1,558)
Number of observations 6360 1552
Wald chi2(38) 447,900 78,100
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000
Pseudo R2 0,036 0,024
Log likelihood -7708 -1942
1   We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Controls: age, marital status, household size,  health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue,
years of education, nationality, region, round. The confidence interval of the reference income
coefficient is 0,002 for those who are anxious about getting necessities, and 0,401 for those who are
not. The same results hold when controlling for the log of total real household income or expenditure.
Lastly, we use the question How concerned are you that you might lose your job?. We
divide the (working) respondents in two groups depending on whether they are
concerned or not (aggregating the multiple responses into two categories). We find
(Table 4.g) that the reference income is always positive but is not significant for those
who are not afraid.28
Table 4.g
The Role of the Reference Income Depending on Job Uncertainty (Working People)
Maximum-Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
1
How afraid are you that you might loose your job ?
Afraid Not afraid
Log Reference Income 0,340***
(0,097)
0,218
(0,141)
Log Individual Income 0,170***
(0,031)
0,228***
(0,049)
_cut1 0,297
(0,861)
0,161
(1,137)
_cut2 2,289
(0,863)
2,101
(1,137)
_cut3 3,717
(0,865)
3,366
(1,139)
Number of observations 4874 3008
Wald chi2(38) 382,050 212,210
Prob > chi2 0,000 0,000
Pseudo R2 0,040 0,033
Log likelihood -5934 -3864
1   We control for the fact that observations that relate to the same individual are correlated.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Controls: age, marital status, household size,  health evaluation, believer, gender, mother tongue, years of education,
nationality, region, round.
The confidence interval of the reference income coefficient is 0,000 for those who are afraid to lose their job, and
0,124 for those who are not.
The same results hold when controlling for the log of total real household income or expenditure.
 All these results suggest that the reference level of income is used predominantly as an
informational category. The analysis of the role of inequality indices further comfort
this cognitive conjecture.
Inequality indices
When introducing inequality measures, whether Gini or Stark indices, in the regressions
of life satisfaction, we find that those are systematically insignificant, whatever the
specification
22 and the controls used (Table 5). This could be attributed to ignorance, i.e.
people do not perceive the distribution of income, hence it does not influence their
                                               
22 For lack of space, we do not present the linear and conditional fixed effects regressions in the text, but
we keep them available upon request.29
satisfaction. To explore this idea, we include Stark and Gini indices calculated at the
regional level, assuming that people may have a better perception of the distribution of
income in their region rather than in the whole country. It turns out that regional
inequality indices as insignificant as well (Table 5). Yet, we verify that people do
perceive their relative position in the national or regional distribution of income. When
asked about their relative economic rank (Please, imagine a 9-step ladder where on the
bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand
the rich. On which step are you today ?), their answer is significantly correlated with
their actual position in the distribution of income, as represented by the STARKH index
or their decile of real individual income (Table D in Annex I). Thus, if inequality
apparently has no influence on life satisfaction, it is not because individuals are unaware
of it.
Hirschman’s conjecture that the revenue of other people affect me through the
information they vehicle can be used again to interpret this result. In a society where
income distribution is perceived to change rapidly, the observed static distribution of
income does not contain an important information value. This could explain why it does
not affect individual subjective satisfaction. The same general framework can be applied
to explain the lower aversion for inequality that Alesina et al. (2000), have put in
evidence in the United States
23. Introducing Gini indices in the estimation of subjective
life satisfaction judgements, they show that inequality indices play an exceptionally
weak role in the satisfaction of Americans, as compared to Europeans. Their
interpretation is that when (perceived) expected mobility is high, the perception of static
inequality is dominated by the prospect for mobility.
                                               
23 Corneo and Grüner (2001), using demand for redistribution data, also observe a particularly low
aversion for inequality in the United-States.30
Table 5
Inequality Indices Do Not Affect Life Satisfaction
Ordered Logit Estimates
(1) (3) (2) (5)
GINI individual income -.727
(.520)
National STARKH 
1 -.0000126
(.0000127)
Regional STARKH 
2 -.0000162
(.0000149)
National STARKL 
3 .0000398
(.0000916)
Regional STARKL 
4 -.0000478
(.0000998)
_cut1 2.229
(.337)
2.478
(.278)
2.463747
(.277)
2.505
(.278)
2.490
(.276)
_cut2 4.046
(.339)
4.296
(.279)
4.280
(.278)
4.324
(.279)
4.307
(.278)
_cut3 5.377
(.339)
5.626
(.280)
5.611
(.279)
5.653
(.280)
5.637
(.278)
Number of obs 18700 18525 18700 18525 18700
Wald chi2(33) 1762.35 1740.01 1758.50 1741.07 1760.12
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0510 0.0506 0.0510 0.0506 0.0510
Log likelihood -23140 -22933 -23139 -22934  -23140
1 STARKH is the measure of the average distance between my real individual income and those of
richer people in the country.
 
2 Regional 
 STARKH is the measure of the average distance between my individual real income
and those of richer people in my region.
3 STARKL is the measure of the average distance between my real individual income and those of
poorer people in the country.
4 Regional
  STARKL is the measure of the average distance between my individual real income and
those of poorer people in my region.
Controls : log(household expenditure), age, age square, health evaluation, believer, gender,
marital status, household size, nationality, years of education, mother tongue, region dummies,
occupation dummies, round dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, **
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The same results hold when controlling for lagged
income expectations and income categories instead of expenditure.31
4. Conclusion
This study has revealed unusual findings. Although basic socio-demographic variables
are correlated in a quite classical way with individual satisfaction, social comparison
indicators are not. The reference group’s income exerts a positive influence on
individual satisfaction, which contrasts with other studies on the subject. This is
particularly true of categories of the population who experience high income volatility
and feelings of uncertainty. Inequality indices do not seem to matter although people do
seem to be aware of the distribution of income.
We interpret these unusual results, especially the positive sign of the reference group’s
income, as a sign of a Hirschman type «tunnel effect» whereby agents use income
variables (the income of other people) in a cognitive manner rather than for comparison
purposes. This may be due to the very rapidly changing context, in which social
comparisons per se lose significance as relative positions are highly unstable. Rather,
agents try to use as much information as possible in order to form their expectations
concerning future variables. In other words, a rapidly changing environment gives a
particularly high value to information as an input for expectations. In this context,
inequality indices, which reflect the static income distribution, do not affect individual
satisfaction because of their weak informational content. By contrast, an increase in the
income of one’s reference group (people with the same productive characteristics) is an
encouraging promise of future income gains.
A brighter version, closer to Hirschman’s intuition, would be that Russians are
optimistic about their chance to gain from the transformation process, which makes
them neutral to the perception of immediate inequality
24. Whatever the preferred
version, the general conclusion is that it is not always the case that people engage into
social comparisons based on frustration or domination schemes. Transition could well
                                               
24 Hirschman's conjecture was two-faceted: in a first stage, he thought that people would tolerate
inequality as a promise for prosperity. In a second stage, however, if these expectations were not fulfilled,
he warned that their attitude towards inequality could soar, bringing a danger of social unrest. So far,
Russia still seems to be in the first phase.32
be a case in which people go back to «fundamentals» and care only for their own sake,
including the information necessary to predict it.
Beyond the case of transition economies, how general is the conjecture that other
people’s revenue affect me essentially through their informational content? And how
much does the respective role of information versus comparison depend on the features
of the environment such as the degree of uncertainty and the prospect for mobility? This
question has obvious policy implications, in particular in the domain of redistribution
policy
25. We believe that there is room for further empirical research in this direction.
                                               
25 For example, one application is the definition of the relevant synthetic measure of perceived income
distribution : should one use static or dynamic measures of inequality (income distribution versus the
distribution of expected income gains)?33
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Additional Tables Based on the RLMS Balanced panel
Round 5 - Round 9   (1994-2000)Table A1- High and Unstable Gini Indices
Household real
income
Household
nominal income
Household real
expenditure
Household
nominal
expenditure
Individual nominal
income
1994 round 5 41 43 42 43 56
1995 round 6 44 43 43 43 61
1996 round 7 50 47 47 47 67
1998 round 8 44 46 46 46 62
2000 round 9 46 45 45 45 57
Table A2 - Other Gini Indices, for Comparison
Source Gini index
Russia 1992 Gross income Milanovic 24
Russia 1994 Gross income Milanovic 48
Austria 1987 Net individual income LIS 23
France 1984 Net household income LIS 32
USA 1991 Net household income LIS 35
Brazil 1988 Personal income Rocha 64
Source : United Nations World Institute for Development Economics
Research, World Income Inequality Database (WIID ).
Table A3 - Variations in Income and Expenditure between 2 Rounds of RLMS (%)
Year Round Real household
average income
Real household
average expenditure
Real household
median income
Real household
median
expenditure
Real Russian
GDP Growth
1994 5
1995 /1994 6 / 5 -21 -16 -23 -15 - 4.1
1996/1995 7 / 6 -4 -11 -9 -17 - 3.5
1998/1996 8 / 7 -22 -26 -19 -25 - 3.8
2000/1998 9 / 8 25 16 19 17 10.5
Source : Author’s calculation using RLMS for household indicators, EBRD Transition Report 2000 and IIF for
Real Russian GDP. Table B1
Basic Regressions of Life Satisfaction on Socio-Demographic Variables
Two Stages Least Squares Fixed Effects Estimations 
1
(1)
Fixed-effects (within) IV
(2)
Between effects IV
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Life satisfaction in t-1
3  0.065 0.044  0.574*** 0.030
Income expectations in t-1
3 -0.01 0.041  0.077** 0.031
Age -0.032 0.100 -.012** 0.005
Age square .000* 0.000  0.000*** 0.000
Bad health
2 .050 0.116  0.256*** 0.085
Average health .296** 0.123  0.401*** 0.083
Good health .310** 0.135  0.435*** 0.090
Very good health .420* 0.214  0.498*** 0.145
Believer (dropped)  0.051* 0.028
Male (dropped)  0.037 0.028
Years of education -0.006 0.017  0.001 0.004
Russian mother tongue (dropped) -.104** 0.036
Northern and North Western 
2 (dropped)  0.004 0.080
Central and Central Black-Earth (dropped) -0.003 0.068
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin (dropped) -0.040 0.068
North Caucasian (dropped) -0.040 0.072
Ural (dropped) -0.028 0.069
Western Siberia (dropped) -0.100 0.072
Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern (dropped)  0.040 0.076
Round 6
2
Round 7
Round 8 -0.222 0.183 -.271*** 0.055
Round 9
Legislators, senior managers, officials -0.020 0.197 .414*** 0.142
Professionals  0.045 0.177 .322*** 0.114
Technicians -0.180 0.169 .240** 0.114
Clerks -0.261 0.206 0.163 0.125
Services and market workers -0.177 0.182 .376*** 0.126
Skilled agr. and fish. Workers  0.889 0.588 0.313 0.283
Craft and related trades  0.001 0.171 .234** 0.116
Machine Operators and Assemblers  0.043 0.170 0.184 0.115
Elementary unskilled occupations  0.064 0.166 0.108 0.119
Army -0.050 0.589 0.305 0.215
Married .386*** .146 .103** .0511
Divorced -.036 .173 .095 .068
Widower -.021 .184 .116* .064
Intercept 1.830 4.699 0.636*** 0.179
Number of observations 5400 5400
Number of groups 2994 2994
R sq. within 0.025 0.118
R sq.between 0.001 0.426
R sq. overall 0.003 0.166
1Eq. (7) and (8): satisfaction in (t-1) and income expectations in (t-1) are instrumented using satisfaction in (t-2), satisfaction in (t-
3) , expectations in (t-2) and expectations in (t-3) as instruments.
3 This implies treating the lagged satisfaction and expectations variables as continuous.
2 Reference categories: for health evaluation: very bad health; for region: metropolis (Moscow, St Petersburg); for rounds: Round
5; for marital status: never married, for ILO code: not working.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%Table B2
Linear Basic Estimations of Life Satisfaction
(1)  Fixed effects (2)  Between effects
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Age -.004 .033 -.022*** .004
Age square  0.0003* .0001  0.0003*** .00005
Bad health
1  0.126** .063  0.236** .1003
Average health  0.289*** .066  0.570*** .093
Good health  0.332*** .071  0.726*** .099
Very good health  0.482*** .105  0.727*** .163
Believer (dropped)  0.101*** .024
Male (dropped)  0.045* .026
Russian mother tongue (dropped) -.080 .054
Years of education -.005 .007  0.006 .004
Northern & North Western
1 (dropped) -.137** .067
Central & Black-Earth (dropped) -.115** .057
Volga (dropped) -.145** .057
North Caucasian (dropped) -.192*** .061
Ural (dropped) -.226*** .058
Western Siberia (dropped) -.259*** .061
Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern (dropped) -.127* .065
Round 6
1 -.007 .153  0.230** .111
Round 7 -.095 .123 (dropped)
Round 8 -.247*** .064 -.101 .109
Round 9 (dropped)  0.184* .102
Legisl., senior manag.  0.152 .095  0.595*** .162
Professionals  0.095 .077  0.372*** .116
Technicians  0.114 .074  0.260** .117
Clerks  0.043 .087  0.129 .125
Services workers  0.057 .084  0.162 .129
Skilled agri. &fish wke  0.168 .234  0.482* .270
Craft and related trades  0.139* .074  0.162 .118
Operators and assemblers  0.152** .074  0.183 .117
Elementary unskilled  0.066 .073  0.044 .119
Army -.008 .263  0.328 .202
Married
1  0.049 .069 -.010 .046
Divorced -.157 .082 -.151** .062
Widower -.071 .086 -.163*** .058
Lagged income expectations :
Worse 
1 -.062** .025 .580*** .047
The same -.077*** .023 .815*** .039
Better -.094*** .034 1.130*** .054
Intercept 1.435 1.561 1.263 .172
sigma_u .783
sigma_e .782
Rho .500
R-sq within 0.036 0.002
R-sq between  0.001 0.264
R-sq overall 0.001 0.094
 F  12.75 32.73
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.402
nb observations 12949 12949
nb groups 3693 3693
1Reference categories : for health evaluation: very bad health; for region: metropolis(Moscow, St Petersburg); for
rounds: Round 5; for marital status: never married; for past income expectations: much worse;  for ILO code: not
working. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%Table B3
Basic Estimation of Life Satisfaction
Conditional Fixed Effects Logit 
1
Coefficient Standard Error
Age .0141 .112
Age square .0009** .00037
Bad health 
2 .0795 .236
Average health .537** .245
Good health .663*** .255
Very good health 1.016*** .347
Years of education -.0119 .023
Round 6 
2 .263 .519
Round 7 .006 .416
Round 8 -.437** .216
Legislators, senior managers, officials .323 .303
Professionals .0146 .241
Technicians .116 .231
Clerks -.036 .279
Services and market workers -.0148 .263
Skilled agriculture and fishery workers .725 .764
Craft and related trades .208 .235
Operators and assemblers .308 .237
Elementary unskilled occupation .0638 .235
Army -.556 .908
Married 
2 .165 .205
Divorced -.352 .264
Widower -.170 .273
Lagged income expectations:
Worse income 
2 -.177** .084
The same income -.197** .078
Better income -.208** .106
Number observations 7011
Number groups 1935
 LR chi2(27) 174.89
Log likelihood -2554
1Conditional fixed effects estimations require aggregating life satisfaction
evaluations into a dichotomic (0 - 1) variable.
2Reference category, for health : very bad, for marital status : single, for rounds :
Round5, for past income expectations : much worse, for ILO code: not working.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%Table C1
The Influence of the Reference Group’s Income
Two Stages Least Squares Estimations
1 of Life Satisfaction
Fixed-effects (within) IV Fixed-effects IV First-Differenced IV First-Differenced IV
Reference income 
2 .327***
(.113)
.288**
(.112)
.324***
(.113)
 .286**
(.112)
Income gap 
3 .0930**
(.0377)
.0639*
(.0380)
.0930**
(.0377)
 .0639*
(.0381)
Household expenditure .1422***
(.0371)
.1421 ***
(.0371)
Number of obs 4152 4152 1558 1558
Number of groups 2594 2594 1558 1558
R-sq:  Within 0.0505 0.0703 .  0.0015
          Between 0.0069 0.0052 0.0028  0.0015
          Overall 0.0045 0.0031 0.0028  0.0015
Chi2 / Wald chi2(10) 30368.35 31009.51 23.41  38.74
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000
corr(u_i, Xb)  -0.888  -0.876 -0.689  -0.688
Sigma_u 1.876 1.794 1.323  1.322
Sigma_e .778 .771 1.101 1.090
Rho .853 .844 .591 .5951
1Satisfaction in (t-1) and income expectations in (t-1) are instrumented using satisfaction in (t-2), satisfaction in (t-3) ,
expectations in (t-2) and expectations in (t-3) as instruments. This implies that satisfaction and income expectations are
treated as continuous variables.
2 The reference income is the estimated income of an individual based on his professional characteristics.
 3 The income
gap is defined as the difference between the current individual income and the reference group’s income, i.e. the
residual of the estimation of the latter.
Controls : age, age square, health evaluation, marital status, household size, years of education, round dummies.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%Table C2
The Influence of the Reference Group’s Income
Conditional Fixed Effects Logit
1 Estimation of Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log reference income 
2 0,290**
(0,144)
.335**
(.145)
.249*
(.145)
.258*
(.145)
.265*
(.146)
Income gap 
3 .0856**
(.0340)
Log individual income .0856**
(.0340)
Log household expenditure .394***
(.079)
Log household income .295***
(.071)
Number of observations 3048 3048 3048 3048 3032
Number of groups 939 939 939 939 935
LR chi2(18) 185.39 191.96 191.96 210.88 202.18
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood -1040 -1036  -1036 -1027 -1026
1Conditional fixed effects estimations require aggregating life satisfaction evaluations into a
dichotomic (0 - 1) variable.
2The reference group’s income is the estimation of the real individual income based on
professional characteristics.  
3The income gap is defined as the difference between the current
individual income and the reference group’s income, i.e. the residual of the estimation of the
latter.
Controls : age, age square, lagged life satisfaction, health evaluation, marital status, household
size, nationality, years of education, round dummies. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,
*** significant at 1%,  standard errors in parenthesis.Table D
Individuals do Perceive their Rank in the Distribution of Income
Regressions of Perceived Economic Rank on a 7-Step Ladder 
1
(1) (2) (3)
Max. Likelihood
Ordered Logit  
2
Max. Likelihood
Ordered Logit 
2
Fixed-Effects (Within)
Linear Estimation
Individual Income Decile .168***
(.0058)
.0552***
(0.0046)
STARKH 
3 -8.75e-06*
(4.65 e-06)
Intercept 3.0405***
(0.027)
_cut1 -1.002  (.0413) -1.855  (0.296)
_cut2 .0619   (.0386) -.835    (0.230)
_cut3 1.121   (.0392) .168     (0.207)
_cut4 2.079   (.0416) 1.087   (0.222)
_cut5 3.798   (.0501) 2.768   (0.037)
_cut6 5.008   (.0705) 3.969   (0.0614)
Number observations 19156 18978 19156
Number groups 4089
Wald chi2(1) 841.51 3.55
Pseudo R2 0.0204 0.0001
Log likelihood -33006 -33370
R-sq. within 0.0094
R-sq. between 0.1595
R-sq. overall 0.0689
F  142.40
1 Initially, responses are given on a 9 steps ladder, but we aggregate the three upper steps together.
2 Individual clusters are defined, i.e. we control for the auto-correlations of the residuals of observations
relating to the same individual.
3 The STARKH index measures the average distance between my income and those of richer people in the
country. The same result hold for regional measures of Stark indices.
Controls : age, age square, health evaluation, believer, gender, marital status, household size,
nationality, years of education, mother tongue, region dummies, occupation dummies, round dummies.
Standard errors in parenthesis.  * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%Annex II
Descriptive statistics of the RLMS balanced panel
Round 5 – Round 9
(1994-2000)Table E1 - Attitudinal variables
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Total
Life satisfaction
1
Not at all satisfied 837 1074 1217 1539 969 5636
% 23 29 32 38 24 29
Less than  satisfied 1620 1440 1454 1410 1569 7493
% 44 39 38 35 39 39
Both yes and no 748 777 761 697 885 3868
% 20 21 20 17 22 20
Satisfied 458 445 395 418 622 2338
% 13 12 10 10 15 12
Total 3663 3736 3827 4064 4045 19335
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income expectations 
2
Much worse 874 848 808 1102 345 3977
% 25 25 24 33 10 23
Somewhat worse 825 743 706 787 522 3583
% 24 22 21 23 16 21
The same as now 1257 1383 1477 1161 1832 7110
% 36 41 43 34 55 42
Better 498 433 423 329 639 2322
% 14 13 12 10 19 14
Total 3454 3407 3414 3379 3338 16992
Concerned about getting necessities for family? 
3
Very concerned 2120 2204 2282 2650 2077 11333
% 58 59 60 66 51 59
A little 763 778 812 796 937 4086
% 21 21 21 20 23 21
Both yes and no 266 287 312 244 417 1526
% 7 8 8 6 10 8
Not too concerned 380 335 283 261 435 1694
% 10 9 7 6 11 9
Not at all 147 134 124 95 180 680
% 4 4 3 2 4 4
Total 3676 3738 3813 4046 4046 19319
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
Income Expectations
Optimistic 1699 1591 1514 1889 867 7560
% 49 47 44 56 26 44
Pessimistic 1755 1816 1900 1490 2471 9432
% 51 53 56 44 74 56
Total 3454 3407 3414 3379 3338 16992
Concerned about job loss?
 4
Very concerned 890 866 853 964 704 4277
% 41 40 41 49 36 41
A little 408 478 497 414 456 2253
% 19 22 24 21 23 22
Both yes and no 184 217 195 171 193 960
% 8 10 9 9 10 9
Not very concerned 341 328 277 224 339 1509
% 16 15 13 11 17 15
Not at all 364 290 268 176 268 1366
% 17 13 13 9 14 13
Total 2187 2179 2090 1949 1960 10365
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
Confident to find job?
 5
Absolutely certain 245 242 180 144 182 993
% 12 11 9 8 10 10
Fairly certain 220 256 211 145 291 1123
% 10 12 11 8 16 11
Both yes and no 244 267 257 207 298 1273
% 11 13 13 11 16 13
Fairly uncertain 594 555 560 481 505 2695
% 28 26 28 26 27 27
Absolutely uncertain 822 794 784 845 567 3812
% 39 38 39 46 31 39
Total 2125 2114 1992 1822 1843 9896
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
1To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time? 
2“Do you think that in the next 12 months, you and your
family will live better than today or worse?” 
3“How concerned are you about the possibility that you might not be able to provide
yourself with the bare essentials in the net 12  months?”, 
4 “How concerned are you that you might loose your job?”, 
5 “Imagine this
not very pleasant scene: the enterprise where you work for some reason will close tomorrow, and all workers will be laid off. How
certain are that you will be able to find work, no worse than your present job?”, continued next page.Table E1 continued
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Total
Health evaluation
Very good health 54 73 54 97 74 352
% 1 2 1 2 2 2
Good health 913 1075 1087 972 882 4929
% 22 26 27 24 22 24
Average health 2427 2261 2266 2254 2313 11521
% 60 56 55 55 57 56
Bad health 594 588 601 655 651 3089
% 15 14 15 16 16 15
Very bad health 89 74 76 104 162 505
% 2 2 2 3 4 2
Total 4077 4071 4084 4082 4082 20396
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
Economic rank 
6
1 486 493 523 691 417 2610
% 13 13 14 17 10 14
2 576 662 634 755 597 3224
% 16 18 17 19 15 17
3 914 874 872 969 961 4590
% 25 24 23 24 24 24
4 782 769 766 786 820 3923
% 21 21 20 20 20 20
5 701 704 749 639 889 3682
% 19 19 20 16 22 19
6 132 161 140 111 229 773
% 4 4 4 3 6 4
7-8-9 68 50 73 52 111 354
% 2 1 2 1 3 2
Total 3659 3713 3757 4003 4024 19156
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
Power rank
 7
1 1231 1075 1031 1249 948 5534
% 34 29 28 32 24 29
2 654 687 727 815 748 3631
% 18 19 20 21 19 19
3 669 750 778 781 742 3720
% 18 20 21 20 19 20
4 497 515 492 485 580 2569
% 14 14 13 12 15 14
5 414 485 501 437 630 2467
% 11 13 14 11 16 13
6 95 102 96 89 162 544
% 3 3 3 2 4 3
7-8-9 63 54 78 51 135 381
% 2 1 2 1 3 2
Total 3623 3668 3703 3907 3945 18846
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
Respect rank
 8
1 114 73 72 86 75 420
% 3 2 2 2 2 2
2 102 81 97 118 79 477
% 3 2 3 3 2 3
3 200 241 193 239 180 1053
% 6 7 5 6 5 6
4 407 469 391 375 378 2020
% 11 13 11 10 10 11
5 1027 983 1059 1056 943 5068
% 29 27 30 28 25 28
6 483 581 562 589 649 2864
% 14 16 16 16 17 16
7-8-9 1231 1174 1213 1315 1531 6464
% 35 33 34 35 40 35
Total 3564 3602 3587 3778 3835 18366
% 100 100 100 100 100 100
6Economic rank: “ please imagine a 9 steps ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest
step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are you today?”, 
7 Power rank: “and now please imagine a 9 steps ladder where on the
bottom, the first step, stand people who are completely without rights, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand those who have a lot of
power. On which step are you ?” 
8 Respect rank: “and now another  9 steps ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand people
who are absolutely not respected, and on the highest step, those who are very respected. On which step of this ladder are you?”Table E2 - Income variables
Total real income Nb observations Mean Std.dev.
Round 5 4081 8260 7550
Round 6 4081 6481 6239
Round 7 4081 6219 7283
Round 8 4081 4846 4944
Round 9 4081 6068 7970
Total real expenditure
Round 5 4081 10949 10275
Round 6 4081 9121 9372
Round 7 4081 8156 9688
Round 8 4081 6042 7200
Round 9 4081 7020 8107
Income overhang Starkh
Round 5 4067 182 378
Round 6 4053 239 711
Round 7 4008 734 8451
Round 8 4020 254 777
Round 9 4062 346 4405
Income overhang Starkl
Round 5 4066 50 38
Round 6 4053 61 143
Round 7 4008 113 1208
Round 8 4018 53 19
Round 9 4062 68 532
Income last month
1
Round 5 3561 167904 227529
Round 6 3765 314045 508328
Round 7 3757 396623 769885
Round 8 4004 483 768
Round 9 3986 1230 1780
1in 1998 (round 8) , a monetary reform divided all prices by 1000.Table E3 - Time varying socio-demographic characteristics
Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9
Freq, Percent Freq, Percent Freq, Percent Freq, Percent Freq, Percent
Marital status
 Never married             362           10,1             468           12,5             540           14,0             711           17,4          649,0           15,9
 Married          2 572           71,7          2 612           69,6          2 583           67,1          2 609           63,8       2 579,0           63,1
 Divorced             264             7,4             251             6,7             264             6,9             259             6,3          270,0             6,6
 Widower             391           10,9             422           11,2             460           12,0             510           12,5          592,0           14,5
 Total 3589 100 3753 100 3847 100 4089 100 4090 100
Household head
Active male 3063 74,8 3015 73,6 2988 73,0 2864 69,9 2743 67,0
Active women 372 9,1 379 9,3 395 9,6 403 9,8 426 10,4
Retired male 421 10,3 446 10,9 458 11,2 550 13,4 601 14,7
Retired female 240 5,9 256 6,3 255 6,2 279 6,8 326 8,0
Total 4096 100 4096 100 4096 100 4096 100 4096 100
ILO primary job
Unemployed 1890 46,24 1897 46,31 1994 48,68 2137 52,2 2115 51,69
Legislators, senior
managers, officials
31 0,76 69 1,68 17 0,42 52 1,27 129 3,15
Professionals 406 9,93 342 8,35 385 9,4 376 9,18 354 8,65
Technicians 314 7,68 313 7,64 326 7,96 320 7,82 279 6,82
Clerks 161 3,94 157 3,83 160 3,91 134 3,27 130 3,18
Services and market
workers
146 3,57 160 3,91 136 3,32 138 3,37 159 3,89
Skilled agr. and fish.
Workers
12 0,29 7 0,17 13 0,32 11 0,27 11 0,27
Craft and related
trades
416 10,18 373 9,11 354 8,64 287 7,01 287 7,01
Operators and
assemblers
425 10,4 441 10,77 408 9,96 375 9,16 377 9,21
Elementary unskilled
occupat.
275 6,73 317 7,74 283 6,91 252 6,16 237 5,79
Army 11 0,27 20 0,49 20 0,49 12 0,29 14 0,34
Total 4087 100 4096 100 4096 100 4094 100 4092 100
ILO second job
Legislators, senior
managers, officials
2 2,63 16 21,62 3 3,61 5 6,1 7 8,24
Professionals 19 25 14 18,92 22 26,51 21 25,61 22 25,88
Technicians 12 15,79 3 4,05 12 14,46 8 9,76 12 14,12
Clerks 2 2,63 7 9,46 3 3,61 2 2,44 2 2,35
Services and market
workers
10 13,16 13 17,57 7 8,43 13 15,85 11 12,94
Skilled agr. and fish.
Workers
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2,35
Craft and related
trades
9 11,84 2 2,7 16 19,28 13 15,85 8 9,41
Operators and
assemblers
6 7,89 19 25,68 2 2,41 6 7,32 4 4,71
Elementary unskilled
occupat.
16 21,05 18 21,69 14 17,07 17 20
Army 76 100 74 100 83 100 82 100 85 100Table E4 - Time invariant characteristics (or quasi)
Min Max
Birth year 1902 1985
Age (round9) 15 98
Freq. Percent
Nationality
Russian 3038 82
CIS 468 13
Rest of the World 192 5
Russian speaking
No 902 22
Yes 3179 78
Russian mother tongue?
No 905 22
Yes 3191 78
Settlement type
Urban 2493 61
Rural 1588 39
Born in Russia ?
No 2097 51
Yes 1984 49
Believer (round 9) ?
No 1197 29
Yes 2899 71
Orthodox ?
No 1000 25
Yes 3081 76
Region
Moscow & St Petersburgh 155 4
Northern and North Western 257 6
Central and Central Black-Earth 834 20
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin 893 22
North Caucasian 556 14
Ural 674 17
Western Siberia 418 10
Eastern Siberia and Far Eastern 294 7
Gender
Male 1676 40,92
Female 2420 59,08
Highest diploma (Round 9)
No diploma 34 0,83
Primary 522 12,76
Professional primary 202 4,94
Short secondary 492 12,02
Long secondary 976 23,85
Secondary + professional 475 11,61
Superior technical 787 19,23
University 604 14,76
Mean Std. deviation
 Household size 3,23 1,58
 Years of education 11 4
 Years of experience 24 15 
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 8/15/02 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 495: When Information Dominates Comparison: A Panel Data 
Analysis Using Russian Subjective Data 
Claudia Senik  May 2002 
No. 494: Corruption and Cross-Border Investment: Firm Level Evidence  Beata K. Smarzynska and Shang-
Jin Wei 
Aug. 2002 
No. 493: Modeling Sequences of Long Memory Positive Weakly 
Stationary Random Variables 
Dmitri Koulikov  Aug. 2002 
No. 492: Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate 
Environmental Performance 
Dietrich Earnhart and Lubomír 
Lízal 
Aug. 2002 
No. 491: Does Economic Uncertainty Have an Impact on Decisions to 
Bear Children?  Evidence from Eastern Germany 
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik and 
Jeffrey B. Nugent 
July 2002 
No. 490: The Reallocation of Workers and Jobs in Russian Industry: 
New Evidence on Measures and Determinants 
J. David Brown and John S. Earle  Aug. 2002 
No. 489: The Incidence and Cost of Job Loss in a Transition Economy: 
Displaced Workers in Estonia, 1989-1999 
Hartmut Lehmann, Kaia Phillips 
and Jonathan Wadsworth 
Aug. 2002 
No. 488: Integration: An Empirical Assessment of Russia  Daniel Berkowitz and David N. 
DeJong 
Feb. 2002 
No. 487: Dual Inflation under the Currency Board: The challenges of 
Bulgarian EU accession 
Nikolay Nenovsky and Kalina 
Dimitrova 
July 2002 
No. 486: Worker Flows, Job Flows and Firm Wage Policies: 
An Analysis of Slovenia 
John Haltiwanger and Milan 
Vodopivec 
July 2002 
No. 485: Do Schumpeterian Waves of Creative Destruction Lead to 
Higher Productivity?  Panel Data Evidence from Poland 
Frederic Warzynski  July 2002 
No. 484: Labor Market Institutions and Restructuring: Evidence from 
Regulated and Unregulated Labor Markets in Brazil 
Jasper Hoek  July 2002 
No. 483: The Balassa-Samuelson effect in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Myth or reality? 
Balázs Égert, Imed Drine, Kirsten 
Lommatzsch and Christophe 
Rault 
July 2002 
No. 482: Real Exchange Rates in Transition Economies  Boštjan Jazbec  July 2002 
No. 481: Labor Force Participation Dynamics in the Romanian Labor 
Market 
Alexandru Voicu  July 2002 
No. 480: Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates in Central Europe’s 
Transition Economies: Knocking on Heaven’s Door 
Balázs Égert  July 2002 
No. 479: The Impact of Minimum Wages on Wage Inequality and 
Employment in the Formal and Informal Sector in Costa Rica 
Fatma El-Hamidi and Katherine 
Terrell 
Apr. 2001 
No. 478: Beyond Oaxaca -Blinder: Accounting for Differences in 
Household Income Distributions 
François Bourguignon, Francisco 
H. G. Ferreira and Phillippe G. 
Leite 
Feb. 2002 
No. 477: Participation Behavior of East German Women after German 
Unification 
Holger Bonin and Rob Euwals  July 2002 
No. 476: Duration and Risk of Unemployment in Argentina  Sebastian Galiani and Hugo A. 
Hopenhayn 
Oct. 2001 
No. 475: After, Before and During: Returns to Education in the 
Hungarian Transition 
Nauro F. Campos and Dean 
Jolliffe 
Apr. 2002 
No. 474: The Locking-in Effect of Subsidized Jobs  Jan C. van Ours  June 2002 
No. 473: How Reform Worked in China  Yingyi Qian  June 2002 
No. 472: An Economic Perspective on Russia’s Accession to the WTO  Robert M. Stern  June2002 
No. 471: The Effects of Ownership Forms and Concentration on Firm 
Performance after Large-Scale Privatization 
Evzen Kocenda and Jan Svejnar  May 2002 
No. 470: Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don’t, and 
What We Should 
Nauro F. Campos and Fabrizio 
Coricelli 
Feb. 2002 
 